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THE ROLE OF NGOS IN POLITICAL
ELECTIONS IN SOUTH KOREA
The Case of the Citizens’ Alliance for
the 2000 General Election
Eui Hang Shin
Abstract
The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the role of civic organizations in political processes in South Korea. More specifically, this article examines the impact of the blacklisting of candidates by the Citizens’ Alliance for the
2000 General Election (CAGE) on the outcomes of the National Assembly
election of April 13, 2000. I discuss the relationship between the characteristics of political systems and political culture and the emergence of civic organizations. I analyze the effects of CAGE’s blacklisting of politicians on the
nomination processes of candidates by major political parties. I also discuss
the long-term effects of CAGE on the political system.

Introduction
The “June 10 Citizens’ Democratic Revolt of 1987”
forced Roh Tae Woo—then a candidate and the heir apparent to President
Chun Doo Hwan—to declare support for the democratization of the political
system and for the liberalization of laws relating to civic organizations. The
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aim of these policies was to provide civic organizations with the opportunity
to organize and conduct their activities in a more liberal environment than
before. Since then, the number of South Korean civic organizations has increased drastically. More than 4,000 civic organizations were in existence as
of 1997.1 The rate of increase in the number of civic organizations has accelerated further since Kim Dae Jung assumed the presidency in February 1998.
The Directory of Korean NGOs, published in 1999 by the Citizens’ Movement Communication Center, listed 7,600 organizations.2 A factor that has
contributed to the proliferation of civic organizations was the increase in government financial assistance to such organizations under the Kim Dae Jung
administration,3 which hoped that non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
would initiate a citizens’ movement to overcome the financial crisis of 1997.4
The growing interest of citizens in political and economic reforms and
other societal issues coincided with the Kim administration’s need for support from civil society in advocating its political and public policy agendas.
Many of the leaders of civic organizations participated in the democratization movement of the 1980s.5 Thus, they were already committed to the
reform movement, and had substantial experience in running NGOs. Civic
organizations such as the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ),
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), Green Korea
United (GKU), and the Korean Foundation for Environmental Movement
(KFEM) established nationwide networks, well-organized administrative
structures, and solid reputations in terms of their programs and records of
accomplishment.
A second factor that provided a favorable environment for the development of citizens’ organizations has been a growing distrust among Koreans of
politicians, political parties, and political systems in general.6 Former presi1. The Citizen’s Newspaper, Directory of Civic Organizations (Seoul: Citizen’s Newspaper,
1997).
2. Roland Wein, “Civic Organizations under the Kim Dae-Jung Government: Puppets or a
New Political Force?” in The Two Koreas in 2000: Sustaining Recovery and Seeking Reconciliation, ed. Korea Economic Institute of America (KEIA) (Washington, D.C.: KEIA, 2000), p. 68.
3. Wein, “Civic Organizations under the Kim Dae-Jung Government,” p. 66.
4. Hyuck Rae Kim, “The State and Civil Society in Transition: The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in South Korea,” The Pacific Review 13:4 (November 2000), p. 595; Hagen
Koo, “The Dilemmas of Empowered Labor in Korea: Korean Workers in the Face of Global
Capitalism,” Asian Survey 40:2 (March/April 2000), pp. 243–47.
5. Kyung Ran Moon, Wooriegen kumi isupnida [We have a dream] (Seoul: Nanam, 2000), p.
493.
6. Richard C. Box, Citizen Governance: Leading American Communities into the 21st Century (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE, 1998), pp. 66–102; Hee Yeon Cho, “Jeongchi gaehyuck,
siminsahwoe eui nachon nakseonundong” [Political reform, blackballing nomination and defeat
movement of civil society] in Siminsahwoewa siminundong [Civil society and citizens’ movement], eds. Pal M. Yu and Jung H. Kim (Seoul: Hanwool, 2001), pp. 192–234; Sang Jin Han,
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dents and their family members have been at the center of a series of major
scandals involving corruption, bribery and other abuses of political power.
Furthermore, the 1997 financial crisis revealed the incompetence and inefficiency of the government bureaucracy, as well as the lack of transparency of
the political system.7 On the whole, the increased distrust of the political
system, the favorable environments for the activities of NGOs, and the availability of experienced civic organizational leadership provided ideal conditions for the participation of civic organizations in political processes. Also,
the Kim Dae Jung administration recruited a substantial number of individuals who were in leadership positions in various citizens’ organizations during
the democratization movement of the 1970s and 1980s.8 Thus, the administration believed that the activities of civic organizations would aid it in carrying out the political reforms Kim was committed to. The 16th National
Assembly election of April 13, 2000, was the first major election under the
Kim administration, and it was regarded as a mid-term vote of confidence on
Kim’s presidency.9

Purpose of the Study
The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the role of Korean civic
organizations in political processes. More specifically, this article examines
the impact of the blacklisting of candidates by the Citizens’ Alliance of the
2000 General Election (CAGE) on the outcomes of the National Assembly
election of April 13, 2000, in South Korea. In the first section, I will discuss
the relationship between the characteristics of political systems and political
culture and the emergence of civic organizations. In the second section, I
will analyze the effects of CAGE’s blacklisting of politicians on the nominations of candidates by major political parties. In the third section, I will discuss the long-term effects of CAGE on the political system. I will also
“The Public Sphere and Democracy in Korea: A Debate on Civil Society,” Korea Journal 37:4
(Winter 1997), pp. 78–97; Ann C. Hudock, NGOs and Civil Society: Democracy by Proxy?
(Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 1–31; Pippa Norris, “Introduction: The Growth of
Critical Citizens?” in Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, ed. Pippa
Norris (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 1–30; Eui Hang Shin, “Social Change,
Political Elections, and the Middle Class in Korea,” East Asia 17:3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 27–59;
Eui Hang Shin, “Political Demography of Korea: An Analysis of the Political Effects of Changes
in Population Composition and Distribution,” East Asia 19:1/2 (Spring/Summer 2001), pp.
179–212.
7. Hagen Koo, “The Dilemmas of Empowered Labor in Korea,” pp. 243–47.
8. Wein, “Civic Organizations under the Kim Dae-Jung Government,” pp. 65–67.
9. Young-Chool Ha, “South Korea in 2000: A Summit and the Search for New Institutional
Identity,” Asian Survey 41:1 (January/February 2001), pp. 32–33; Hong Nack Kim, “The 2000
Parliamentary Election in South Korea,” Asian Survey 40:6 (November/December 2000), pp.
901–04.
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identify important factors that have contributed to the effectiveness of CAGE
in defeating blacklisted candidates.
Data and Methods of Analysis
Information about the activities of CAGE was obtained from major South
Korean newspapers from September 1999 to May 2000. In particular, the
special archives of the Joongang Ilbo (Central Daily) on the April 13 National Assembly election were the primary sources of the data used to analyze
CAGE activities related to blacklisting potential candidates. The archives
supplied the list of potential candidates who had been rejected by CAGE.
The data included the reasons cited by CAGE for its objection to each candidate. The archives also included information about the nominees of major
parties that were on the CAGE “defeat list.” I will first examine the CAGE
blacklist of potential major-party nominees, and then will investigate the
CAGE defeat list.

Procedural Democracy and
Civic Organizations
Historical correlates of the emergence of civil society have had an important
influence on the characteristics of civic organizations. Thus, it is essential to
consider the South Korean political culture, in order to place civic organizations in the proper context of the political structures. Below, I will discuss
the dynamic interplay between the formal and informal structures of political
power in South Korea, and examine the role of NGOs in such political structures.
David I. Steinberg uses the term “imperial presidency” to note that there is
little difference in the images of success and failure of political leadership
between a typical monarch of the Yi Dynasty (1392–1910) and a democratically elected Korean president.10 His observations remain appropriate descriptions of South Korean political culture. Steinberg argues that fundamental elements of traditional political systems and attitudes toward power
are still intact, with such political traditions frequently manifested in political
practices.11 Nevertheless, the dynamics of interrelationship between state
and civil society have changed since 1987, especially during the two civilian
administrations of Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. One of the important
factors that have redefined the nature of the relationship between state and
civil society has been the role of civic organizations. The state-society rela10. David I. Steinberg, “Korean Politics: The New and Old,” in The Two Koreas in 2000:
Sustaining Recovery and Seeking Reconciliation, ed. KEIA (Washington, D.C.: KEIA, 2000), p.
56.
11. Steinberg, “Korean Politics,” p. 56.
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tionship in Korea was transformed from “strong state-weak society” to
“strong state-weak but contentious society” during the era of the military authoritarian regimes between 1961 and 1987. Since 1987, although the state
has remained strong, the relative status of civil society has improved remarkably. Thus “strong state-strong society” may be a reasonable view of the
current conditions.12
The weaknesses inherent in a traditionally strong Korean state, such as
civil rights issues, corruption of the power elite, and the ineffectiveness of
bureaucracy, gave rise to the role of NGOs. The military authoritarian regimes had to deal with opposition parties, and progressive student, labor, and
religious groups that relentlessly challenged the regimes’ legitimacy. The
authoritarian presidents, Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Hwan, and Roh Tae
Woo, utilized coercive strategies to maintain and solidify their power base.
One of the most interesting political realities is that the two civilian presidents, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, who championed the democratization movement throughout their political struggle as opposition leaders and
were elected through free and democratic elections, turned out to be “imperial presidents,” not substantially different from their predecessors with military backgrounds. Thus, it can be argued that the formal aspects of the
governance system may have changed significantly in the transition from a
military to a civilian presidency, but the nature of the informal structures and
the actual exercise of presidential power were largely sustained, despite substantial progress made in the democratization of the political system. The
evidence of the imperial presidency can be easily detected in institutionalized
political practices such as the dominance of the Blue House (the presidential
palace) in its relationship with the cabinet, the National Assembly, and the
judiciary system. An example of the imperial presidency that is relevant to
this study is the influence of the president, as head of his party, on the nomination of candidates for the National Assembly, both for election districtlevel and proportional-representation candidates. In the absence of a primary
to select each party’s nominee at the election district level, the central nomination committee of the party reviews the applicants’ credentials and selects
the nominees. However, the president, as party head, names the nomination
committee and, as a result, may effectively hand-pick the party’s nominees.
The nomination committee essentially rubber stamps the president’s choices
and makes it appear that deliberations on nominations go through a formal
independent process.
12. Hagen Koo, “Strong State and Contentious Society,” in State and Society in Contemporary Korea, ed. Hagen Koo (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 232–33; Richard
Rose, Doh C. Shin, and Neil Munro, “Tensions between the Democratic Ideal and Reality: South
Korea,” in Critical Citizens, ed. Pippa Norris (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.
154–64.
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Civic organizations have challenged the entire political system—the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches, as well as the ruling and opposition
parties, the intelligence agency, the tax organization, and law enforcement
organizations—for their anti-democratic practices and lack of transparency.
Civic organizations also have attracted a large number of experienced professionals with expertise in various fields. These professionals tend to have
strong commitments toward their organization’s causes, such as economic
justice, civil rights, clean environments, and transparency of the political system. With such commitment and quality of personnel, civic organizations
have been able to produce solid findings from their investigative research on
current political, economic, environmental, and other types of policy issues.
Both government and opposition parties need as much support from civic
organizations as they can get, in order to solidify their power bases. Hence,
these organizations have occupied a strategic position from which they can
establish networks of influence on political and social reform processes. Of
course, civic organizations have had to establish their credibility on the basis
of factors such as their impartiality; their independence from established political parties; the democratic nature of their programs and activities; their
emphasis on issues and reforms that directly promote the popular welfare;
and the quality of their leaderships. Many Koreans believe that the major
civic organizations have garnered such credibility on the basis of their past
track records. In a sense, the activities of CAGE in the 2000 National Assembly election were the first and most significant test of civic organizations
within the political process in Korea. The following sections will document
CAGE’s activities in the parliamentary election.

CAGE Blacklisting of Potential
Candidates for the National
Assembly Election
In the months leading up to the April 13, 2000, elections, the leaders of civic
organizations argued that the major political parties were not sufficiently reform-oriented. They asserted that political reform and transparency would
have to be initiated by citizens’ movements.13 One of the most effective
courses of action for political reform proposed by civic organization leaders
was to replace corrupt, incompetent, opportunistic, and self-serving politicians with well-qualified fresh faces with impeccable backgrounds. Thus, the
primary purpose of blacklisting established politicians was to publicize the
unacceptable characteristics of potential candidates in order to pressure the
parties not to nominate such individuals, and also to motivate voters to defeat
those blacklisted if they were nominated. On January 12, the CAGE was
13. Shindonga Monthly [New East Asia Monthly], February 2000, pp. 138–79.
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formally organized, with more than 450 organizations as participating members.14 Its immediate plans included organizing a campaign against Article
87 of the Election Law, which prohibited civic groups from election-related
campaign activities. Another major goal was to develop a set of guidelines
for the nomination of candidates for the 16th National Assembly, and to publish a list of politicians who were deemed unfit to run.
On January 10, before the CAGE blacklist was publicized, the CCEJ published a list of 164 politicians it had evaluated as unfit for nomination. Of
these, 66 were affiliated with the Grand National Party (GNP), 50 with the
National Council for New Politics (NCNP; later renamed the Millennium
Democratic Party [MDP]), and 32 with the United Liberal Democrats
(ULD). 15 One hundred twenty-three were current members of the 15th National Assembly. It is interesting to note that the list was evenly divided
between the ruling coalition of the NCNP/ULD and the GNP/independents.
It is also interesting to note that CCEJ was a highly regarded civic organization, yet it decided not to join CAGE for activities targeting the April election. This prior publication points to disagreement between CCEJ and CAGE
on the nature of civic organizations’ election participation.
On January 24, CAGE announced that it had blacklisted 66 politicians as
unfit to be nominated by any party.16 As a nod to popular sentiments, CAGE
indicated that it had relied on the evaluation of the potential candidates by the
Committee of One Hundred Voters, appointed by CAGE.17 However, it was
reported that the leadership went through a series of painful debates before
finalizing the blacklist.18 The distribution of the blacklisted politicians by
party affiliation was as follows: 29 for GNP, 16 for NCNP, 16 for ULD, and
five independents. This blacklisting was a serious setback for the entire
group of Korean politicians, in that voters believed a large number of the
potential candidates were unfit to serve on the National Assembly in view of
their past track record. In any case, it appeared that ULD was hit hardest,
because Kim Jong Pil, ULD head and a former prime minister, was one of the
politicians blacklisted. The CAGE blacklist included other big shots in Korean politics: Park Joon Kyu, then-incumbent speaker of the National Assembly; Kim Yoon Hwan, an influential GNP leader for the Taegu and
Kyungbuk regions and five-term member of the National Assembly; Oh Sae
Woong, a seven-term member and vice speaker of the National Assembly;
and Jung Mong Joon, a son of Hyundai chairman Jung Joo Young and a two14. Joongang Ilbo [Central Daily], January 13, 2000, p. 5.
15. Shindonga, February 2000, pp. 164–65.
16. Joongang Ilbo, January 25, 2000, p. 4.
17. Cho, “Political Reform, Blackballing Nomination and Defeat Movement of Civil Society,” pp. 295–96.
18. Moon, We Have a Dream, pp. 51–83.
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term member. By including such powerful big-name politicians on the blacklist, CAGE was able to generate an immediate and significant amount of publicity, and thus attract attention from both the political establishment and
voters.
In addition, on January 27, the Citizens’ Alliance for Political Reform
(CAPR) released a list of 15th National Assembly members whose past
records it felt voters should be aware of. Eighty-seven members of the National Assembly were on their blacklist. Compared with the two previously
announced lists, the CAPR blacklist included proportionally greater numbers
of National Assembly members who were affiliated with the MDP: 33 for
MDP, 30 for GNP, 20 for ULD, and 4 independents. Twenty-nine members
of the 15th National Assembly were on all of the three blacklists (CCEJ,
CAGE, and CAPR), and were labeled as members with “three strikes” or a
“triple crown.”19
Although the criteria used by the three civic organizations varied, there
was substantial overlap in the records the organizations used in developing
the blacklists. The criteria included the following track records of each potential candidate: conviction for taking bribes, conviction for violating election laws, provocation of regional animosity to obtain support from voters in
a specific region, frequent switching of party affiliation, speculative investment in real estate, serving as a member of the National Security Council’s
legislative committee under the authoritarian regime of Chun Doo Hwan, taking expensive foreign trips, and making statements unbecoming to a lawmaker.20
The reactions of political parties and politicians to the CAGE blacklist varied substantially. President Kim Dae Jung indicated that “citizens’ movements such as the CAGE blacklisting of politicians were due to the fact that
the public lost confidence in the political establishment and the CAGE campaign was a natural course of development toward a true participatory democracy.”21 The spokesperson for the MDP asserted that his party would
consider the information disclosed by CAGE when reviewing candidates for
the party’s nomination for the 16th National Assembly. He also said that the
blacklisting would not hurt the party in the 16th National Assembly election.
As expected, the ULD reacted with extreme disapproval, even suggesting that
the blacklisting was a product of a conspiracy involving political strategists
of the MDP.22 The ULD suspected that the head of the policy and planning
secretariat of the Blue House, and the chairman of the policy and planning
19. Joongang Ilbo, January 27, 2000.
20. Cho, “Political Reform, Blackballing Nomination and Defeat Movement of Civil Society,” pp. 294–98; Moon, We Have a Dream, pp. 51–83.
21. Joongang Ilbo, January 15, 2000, B-5.
22. Ibid., Janaury 25, 2000, B-4.
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committee of the MDP, both of whom had had long careers in the citizens’
movement for democratization, had close ties to the leaders of CAGE and
had influenced the deliberations on determining the blacklist.23 On the other
hand, GNP’s leader Lee Hoi Chang did not make any official comments on
the CAGE blacklist, and appeared to waver on the issue. However, GNP’s
spokesperson agreed with CAGE on the inclusion of Kim Jong Pil on the
blacklist, but criticized CAGE for not including Lee In Jeh, who lost GNP’s
nomination race and then ran as a third-party candidate in the 1997 presidential election. Lee In Jeh’s candidacy helped Kim Dae Jung to win the presidential election in a three-way race among Lee Hoi Chang, Lee In Jeh, and
Kim Dae Jung.24
On February 2, CAGE released a second blacklist, which included 47 politicians identified by CAGE as unfit. CAGE reported that the 47 were selected out of 600 politicians in the pool. This list included 30 current
members of the 15th National Assembly who were not included in the first
round of evaluation, former members of the National Assembly, former ministers and vice ministers of the cabinet, and governors and mayors who were
expected to run in the 16th National Assembly election. In contrast with the
composition of the first blacklist, only six on the second list were members of
the 15th National Assembly. Forty-one were former members of the National Assembly, former cabinet members, or high-ranking government officials of the military regimes. Of the 47, 33 were linked to corruption charges.
Several of those politicians who occupied important positions in the Chun
Doo Hwan regime were on the list, despite the fact that the statute of limitations on their charges had expired.25
The shock effect of the second blacklist was not as great as that of the first
list, simply because several blacklists had already been released by other
civic organizations. Nevertheless, spokespersons of major parties, as well as
those who were on the list, reacted more aggressively than before by questioning the impartiality and motives of CAGE.26 In particular, the spokesperson of the GNP demanded that those who were pro-Kim Dae Jung and were
past members of the NCNP political reform committee resign from the leadership positions of CAGE immediately.27 He also pointed out that the Kim
administration had provided the civic organizations with a large amount of
financial assistance, more than 192.5 billion won ($17.5 million) since
23. Ibid., February 25, 2000, p. 3.
24. Ibid., January 25, 2000, B-3.
25. Ibid., February 2, 2000, p. 3.
26. Cho, “Political Reform, Blackballing Nomination and Defeat Movement of Civil Society,” pp. 297–98; Moon, We Have a Dream, pp. 94–208.
27. Joongang Ilbo, February 3, 2000, p. 3.
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1998.28

The spokesperson argued that those civic organizations that had received financial assistance from the government would not be objective in
dealing with the fitness of politicians to be candidates for the National Assembly.29
The spokesperson for the ULD emphasized that both the Central Election
Council and the Prosecutor’s Office had ruled that the CAGE blacklisting
was a violation of the election laws. He argued that it was not worthwhile to
comment on the illegal activities of CAGE. Interestingly, he pointed out that
the core members of CAGE had previously advocated the abolition of the
National Security Law and the withdrawal of the United States military
troops from Korea. Hence, he implied that the ideological “make-up” of
some members of CAGE was questionable.30 Even the spokesperson for the
MDP commented that the objectivity and fairness of CAGE blacklists were
questionable. The press was generally supportive of CAGE, but some newspapers reported that CAGE rushed in the deliberations for the second list so it
could be released before the lunar New Year holidays, and thus, included
individuals who apparently did not intend to run for National Assembly seats.
On February 10, CAGE announced its decision to drop two individuals from
the blacklist after discovering that the charge against one was not substantiated, and that the other had decided not to run in the election.31
Nomination of Candidates
Observation of behavior patterns of the leaders of major political parties in
the nomination processes, and the corollary effects on the results of the election, reveal some interesting dynamics of Korean political culture. As indicated earlier, the nomination processes of major parties revealed hitherto
unheard-of outcomes, in that a large number of incumbents of the two major
parties failed to win their respective party’s nomination. It is important to
consider the nomination processes of each of the major political parties for
the April 13 National Assembly election.
Grand National Party. On February 18, less than two months before the
election, the GNP announced its slate of nominees. Those incumbents who
expected but failed to obtain the nomination described the GNP slate as the
“February 18 Great Massacre.”32 Of the 109 district-level incumbents of the
GNP, 28 (25.7%) failed to get the GNP’s nomination. This was the largest
proportion of incumbents not being nominated by their party in the history of
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid.
Ibid., February 10, 2000, p. 3
Ibid., February 18, 2000, p. 3.
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elections.33

National Assembly
In particular, none of the six incumbents
who had served six terms or longer in the National Assembly received GNP
nominations. Also, only eight of 17 incumbents who served four or five
terms were nominated by the GNP. Those nominees who replaced the experienced incumbents were relatively young “new faces” and had close ties with
Lee Hoi Chang. In particular, the GNP nominated 12 “386 generation” candidates in the Seoul-Inchon-Kyonggi region, meaning persons in their thirties
who entered college in the 1980s, and were born in the 1960s.
The majority of those incumbents who failed to get GNP nominations were
not in the mainstream factional structure, and were opposing Lee’s total control of the party. Conveniently, Lee’s faction had legitimate excuses for
dropping old-timers, in view of public opinion and the blacklisting by civic
organizations. With the announcement of the party’s slate of nominees, Lee
Hoi Chang put strong and irreversible imprints on GNP leadership and his
relationships with former President Kim Young Sam. However, those who
failed to get GNP nominations subsequently became the founding members
of a splinter party, the Democratic National Party (DNP), thus dividing the
GNP’s traditionally strong support base in the Youngnam region.
Millennium Democratic Party. The deadline for submitting a nomination
application to the MDP was February 7, nearly two months before election.
The total number of applications was 1,041. Of the 90 incumbents, 26 (29%,
including six who decided not to seek nomination) failed to get an MDP
nomination.34 Also, 21 applicants for MDP nomination were on the CAGE
blacklist, and 12 of them were nominated by the MDP. Of the 28 election
districts in Honam, eighteen incumbents were nominated. In announcing the
nominees, the MDP officers emphasized the fact that nearly one-third of their
nominees were not involved in politics prior to their applications for MDP
nomination, thus highlighting their clean backgrounds. The MDP indicated
that about 37% of their nominees were under age 50. Also, eight women
were nominated for district seats. This nomination of female candidates for
the National Assembly by a major political party was unheard of at the time.
On the whole, the MDP attempted to present an image among voters that it
had nominated young and fresh new faces with successful professional backgrounds, people who were not contaminated by corruption or old politics. It
should be noted that some of President Kim’s close lieutenants gave up their
district seats, in a gesture of supporting the party’s image-building efforts.
This action indicated that Kim and his party were reform-oriented and receptive to the sentiments of the general public that “water in a pond has to be
drained and filled with fresh water.”
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.; February 17, 2000, p. 5.
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United Liberal Democrats. On February 18, the ULD released an initial list
that included its nominees for 108 election districts. Several points should be
noted about nominations by the ULD. First, 34 of the 41 district-level incumbents were nominated, and thus the proportion of incumbents who failed to
receive their party’s nomination was considerably lower than those for the
GNP and MDP. Second, the ULD delayed decisions on nominees until the
GNP and MDP had determined their slates of nominees. This was by design,
so that the ULD would be able to recruit those who were not selected by the
other parties. Third, by delaying nomination decisions, the party discouraged
those who failed to get nominated from seeking other parties’ nominations or
from running as independents, as they would lack the time needed to do so
before the election. Nonetheless, the news media reported that the ULD slate
of nominees failed to account for voter sentiments of reform orientations and
the presence of fresh faces. Moreover, it was reported that among the three
major party leaders, Kim Dae Jung, Lee Hoi Chang, and Kim Jong Pil, Kim
Jong Pil had greater control over the nomination process than the others.35

Effects of CAGE Blacklisting on the
Nomination of Candidates
The effects of the CAGE blacklisting campaign against the nomination of
unfit politicians were mixed. A total of 113 potential candidates were on the
CAGE first and second blacklists. Of the 113 on the original list, 11 did not
seek nomination. Forty-eight of the 102 on the blacklists failed to win party
nomination.36 Among the nominees on the CAGE blacklists were 18 for
GNP, 12 for MDP, and 10 for ULD.
On February 21, CAGE declared in a press conference that it would start a
recall campaign against those 40 nominees of the major parties who were
blacklisted.37 CAGE leaders decided to file a lawsuit against the major parties on the ground of violating the Political Party Law. Article 31 stipulates
that each political party is required to select nominees through a democratic
procedure. However, CAGE’s attempt to recruit party members as plaintiffs
failed, and CAGE abandoned the litigation route of nullifying the nomination
of blacklisted candidates.
CAGE’s “Defeat Movement”
On April 3, CAGE announced a list of 86 candidates who were targeted for
defeat in the National Assembly election. Of the 86, 64 were on CAGE’s
first and second blacklists and were registered as candidates for the election.
35. Ibid.; February 3, 2000, p. 3; February 6, 2000, p. 5.
36. Moon, We Have a Dream, p. 110.
37. Ibid.
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Twenty-two were those who were accused by citizens for alleged election
campaign infractions and/or tax evasion, or for instigating regional animosities.38 Of those on the defeat list, 28 were affiliated with GNP, 16 with
MDP, 18 with ULD, 8 with DNP, 3 with Korea New Party, and 13 were
independents. An interesting scene occurred at the press conference where
the defeat list was announced. When the names were called, CAGE members
waved red cards that recalled the use of red cards in a soccer game, i.e.,
ejection for committing a serious foul.
The regional branches of CAGE added four more candidates to the defeat
list, bringing the total to 90. Of these candidates, 22 were identified by
CAGE as “most problematic—candidates who were targeted for defeat with
concentrated effort.”39 Nine of the 22 were affiliated with GNP, seven with
MDP, four with ULD, and 2 with DNP. Most of the 22 candidates labeled as
“most problematic” were senior-level politicians in their respective parties.
Two of the 22 “most problematic” candidates were also identified by other
civic organizations.
With its April 3 press conference, CAGE started a full-scale campaign
against the candidates on its list. A nationwide campaign was organized by
CAGE headquarters in Seoul. Ten extended area-level (major cities) chapters
and 53 local autonomous unit-level chapters were mobilized in their respective geographic areas. In addition, CAGE established linkages to civic organizations with specialized areas of concerns to garner assistance on specific
campaign issues.40 CAGE indicated that it would organize street demonstrations, call and inform voters about the movement to defeat the blacklisted
candidates, and send voters electronic mail concerning the defeat campaign.
Moreover, CAGE designated each of the leaders of civic organizations that
were participating in CAGE as a “marksman-in-charge.” Each “marksmanin-charge” was given the responsibility of carrying out the defeat campaign in
an assigned election district. Park Won Soon, chairman of CAGE, was assigned to the Kangdong district of Seoul. His target was Kim Joong Wi, who
was a nominee of the GNP and was on the “most problematic” candidate list.
Kim Joong Wi allegedly made remarks on the issue of torture that were regarded as anti-women’s civil rights.41
The participation of CAGE leaders in the defeat campaign at a district
level turned out to be an effective strategy for publicizing CAGE causes, as
38. Ibid.
39. Wein, “Civic Organizations under the Kim Dae-Jung Government,” p. 21.
40. Dae Hwa Chung, “Siminsahwoeei naksunundongeui jeongae gwajunggwa jeongchijog
euii” [The development processes and political significance of the citizens’ defeat movement in
the 2000 National Assembly election], in 4.13 chongseon [The April 13 general election], eds.
Chan Wook Park et al. (Seoul: Nanam, 2000), pp. 155–85.
41. Moon, We Have a Dream, p. 232.
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well as for generating voters’ support for the campaign. It should be noted,
however, that CAGE street and bus-tour campaigners ran into physical confrontations with the campaign workers of the blacklisted candidates. CAGE
leaders were interested in generating support from and participation of young
voters in the defeat campaign. The leaders shared a view that one of the most
effective methods of approaching young voters would be through a cultural
event befitting their tastes; thus, CAGE organized the “Daehakro Woodstock
Festival” on April 8, five days before the election. The festival included various events, but the highlight was a concert in which several popular performers entertained about 50,000 young people.42 Near the end of the concert,
the young audience members were waving red cards reading “Out!” to the
rhythm of the music. The event attracted the largest crowd of CAGE’s threemonth long campaign. CAGE also published resource materials on political
and judiciary reforms to publicize its position that the election campaign
should involve debates on policy proposals from different political parties
and candidates. In addition, CAGE organized a drive to gather candidates’
pledges for political reforms, if they were elected. Approximately 450 candidates signed the pledges between April 3 and 13.43
Of the 86 candidates on the CAGE list, 59 lost the election. Fifteen of the
22 “most problematic” candidates were not elected.44 The most revealing
information about the impact of the CAGE campaign on election outcomes
was the election results for nine of the 22 candidates on the list. The win or
loss status of 13 of them was predictable. The remaining nine candidates had
a very tight race, and thus the outcome was too close to call. It turned out
that eight of the nine lost the election.45 The effects of the CAGE campaign
varied significantly by region. In the Seoul area, 19 out of 20 on the blacklist
were defeated, while in the Chungchong region, 15 of the 18 on the defeat list
lost.46 In Honam, the home region and power base of Kim Dae Jung, six of
eight were defeated. However, in Youngnam, traditionally a stronghold of
the GNP, only 16 among 35 on the list were defeated.47 In particular, none
of those who were defeated in the Youngnam region were GNP nominees;
the nominees on the CAGE defeat list were primarily from the MDP and
DNP. Hence, even those who were on the list and lost the election in the
Youngnam region were defeated largely because of their party affiliation, and
not due to being blacklisted.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Ibid., pp. 245–50.
Chung, “The Development Processes,” p. 172.
Hong Nack Kim, “The 2000 Parliamentary Election in South Korea,” pp. 904–09.
Moon, We Have a Dream, p. 256.
Ibid., p. 257.
Ibid.
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It is important to comment on variations in the effectiveness of CAGE’s
blacklisting activities. For example, why was it so effective in the Seoul
region but less so in the Youngnam region? Did the demographic characteristics of the electoral districts (metropolitan versus non-metropolitan areas)
make a difference in the CAGE campaigns? Did the degree of the alleged
wrongdoing on the part of the blacklisted candidates as charged by CAGE
make the difference? In determining the effects of CAGE’s blacklisting campaign, two election outcome variables were examined: candidates’ vote
shares and win-lose status. Since a host of other variables, including the
characteristics of districts and candidates, party affiliation, and campaign
spending, influence the election outcomes, it is essential to control for these
factors to isolate the effects of the blacklisting. Horowitz and Kim used multivariate regression models to analyze the impact of CAGE’s blacklisting on
the outcomes of the April general election.48 They reported that “blackballing was most likely to influence Seoul voters, and especially likely to hurt
MDP candidates.”49 They observed that “Seoul voters, with their weaker
party loyalties, would be more likely to switch away from blackballed candidates that they otherwise prefer,” and that “candidates from the party with the
most reformist reputation were most vulnerable to such defections.”50 As
previously indicated, a high level of regional loyalty to particular parties
outside the Seoul region, especially in the Youngnam and Homan regions,
has been one of the most significant aspects of South Korean political culture.51 The fact that the GNP won all but one of the 65 seats in the
Youngnam region, while the MDP won 25 of 29 seats in the Honam region,
and the ULD won 11 of 12 district-level seats in the Chungchong-Taejon
region, shows that party loyalties overpowered the effects of blacklisting.
Variations were observed in metropolitan/non-metropolitan areas with regard to the possible differential effects of blackballing on the election outcomes.52 Of the total 86 blacklisted candidates, 34 ran in election districts of
large metropolitan areas (Seoul, Busan, Taegu, Taejon, Inchon, Kwangju, and
Ulsan), and 52 ran in smaller metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. In the
large metropolitan areas, 26 of the 34 blacklisted candidates (76.5%) lost,
while 19 of 52 (63.5%) lost, in the smaller areas. It is interesting to note that
48. Shale Horowitz, and Sunwoong Kim, “Public Interest Blackballing in South Korea’s Elections: One Trick Pony or Wave of the Future,” Party Politics (2002), forthcoming.
49. Ibid., pp. 19–20. Both candidates’ vote shares and win-lose status are used as dependent
variables.
50. Ibid., p. 19.
51. Far Eastern Economic Review, February 24, 2000; Shin, “Political Demography of Korea,” pp. 191–92; Horowitz and Kim, “Public Interest,” p. 7.
52. Horowitz and Kim, “Public Interest,” pp. 31–32; Shin, “Political Demography of Korea,”
p. 191.
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three out of nine blacklisted GNP nominees who ran in the large metropolitan
areas, and six out of 13 blacklisted GNP nominees in the other areas, were
defeated; thus, there was no significant difference in election outcomes by
size of area. In contrast, the blacklisted MDP nominees who ran in the large
metropolitan areas suffered more than those who ran in smaller areas. Six
out of seven lost in large metropolitan areas, while six out of nine lost in the
other areas. For the blacklisted independents and ULD and DNP nominees,
the difference in defeat rates between the two areas was not significant. Being blacklisted in the Seoul region signified a defeat, regardless of the candidate’s party affiliation, while the differences between the large metropolitan
areas and the other areas in the defeat rate for blacklisted candidates who ran
in other regions were not significant for all parties. Thus, the effects of regionalism and party loyalty were much stronger than the effects of metropolitan/non-metropolitan characteristics of the election district, per se. Finally,
the Central Election Commission (CEC) reported the amount of property tax
paid by the candidate over the three years before filing for candidacy, as well
as the candidate’s history of military service, if any. The results of the multiple regression analysis showed that property tax payment and military-service
status did not have any significant effects on the election outcomes when the
effects of other variables were controlled for.53

Discussion
As indicated, the CAGE blacklisting and defeat campaigns had significant
effects on both the nomination processes of candidates by major parties, as
well as on the final outcomes of the National Assembly election. The significance of CAGE activities goes far beyond their effects on the election results.
Dae Hwa Chung asserted that in the context of Korean political history, the
CAGE campaign signified that citizens were reclaiming the long-lost right to
self-determination and securing the basic rights guaranteed in a participatory
democracy.54 Further, the anti-nomination and defeat campaigns can be
viewed as a people’s resistance movement, or a civil disobedience movement
against the political party-centered election systems and undemocratic political practices that essentially have limited the participation of civil society in
the election process. It is important to note that the political reform movement was not initiated by political parties or the executive, legislative, or
judiciary branches, but by civic organizations. Hence, the political activism
of CAGE should be regarded as a citizens’ movement for political reforms or

53. Horowitz and Kim, “Public Interest,” pp. 31–32. Candidates’ age, incumbency, party,
and region are controlled.
54. Chung, “The Development Processes,” p. 173.
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a citizens’ political revolution that addressed the imbalance of power between
political and civil society.55
It is essential to evaluate the long-term effects of CAGE and its activities.
First, as Steinberg notes, CAGE set a historical precedent that “civil society
organizations are likely to play increasingly important roles in the political
process and . . . any future government will ignore them at its peril.”56 Second, the actions of CAGE helped “to increase citizens’ participation in politics as well as their political awareness.”57 In particular, the political activism
of civil society helped young voters become active in civic organizations,
and to directly participate in the election by exercising their right to vote, as
well as by monitoring the campaign process. Third, CAGE proved the possibility of coordination among various civic organizations having diverse
causes and agendas, and also demonstrated the solidarity of civil society
movements based on common causes. Although approximately 450 civic organizations participated in the formation of CAGE, the total number of such
groups that committed to CAGE increased to more than 800 by the time of
the defeat campaign. CAGE’s political independence, as well as the credibility, devotion, and experience of CAGE leaders in civic organizations, were
important factors that made CAGE a unified force in political activism.
What are the lessons from the shortcomings of CAGE for future political
activism by civil society in Korea? First, the political activism of CAGE did
not directly translate into an increase in citizens’ political participation. The
voter participation rate in the April election (57.2%) was the lowest in the
history of the National Assembly. The participation rate in the 15th National
Assembly election of 1996 was 63.9%. It would be unfair to suggest that
CAGE was responsible for the decrease in the voter participation rate. However, it is reasonable to argue that CAGE did not help voters evaluate the
differences in qualifications of candidates running in each election district,
other than stating that the 86 blacklisted persons were unacceptable. Considering that more than 1,000 candidates ran in the 16th National Assembly
election in 227 election districts, CAGE’s blacklisting and defeat campaigns
had serious limitations.
Second, CAGE was not effective in blocking out regionalism, despite
pressing for such rejection during the campaign and repeatedly warning both
the political party leadership and the candidates not to recruit voters by using
regional sentiments. In particular, of the 65 seats in the Youngnam region,
GNP won 64. The only exception was Jung Mong Joon, who was elected in
Ulsan City, where a large number of voters were connected to Hyundai in
55. Ibid., p. 174.
56. Steinberg, “Korean Politics,” p. 60.
57. Wein, “Civic Organizations under the Kim Dae-Jung Government,” p. 71.
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one way or another. Even in other regions, the tendency of voters to support
candidates on the basis of party leaders’ regional connection was extremely
strong. Voting behavior in the April election reaffirmed that regionalism is
the most serious and persistent obstacle to systemic political reform and progress toward a mature and liberal participatory democracy.
What are the prospects for civic organizations’ future role in the elections,
in light of other interest groups’ professed intention to carry out electioneering activities by organizing political action committees? CAGE, after declaring its blacklist campaign successful, disbanded after the election. The
representatives of organizations that had participated in the alliance indicated
that they would resume their respective primary programs. Post-mortem debates discussed the past and future roles of citizens’ organizations in Korean
elections. Leaders of citizens’ organizations who were active participants in
CAGE activities argued that the blackballing was an effective method of promoting election and political reforms, and that citizens’ organizations should
continue to play the role of watchdogs in future elections. Leaders of conservative political parties pointed out that the CAGE movement was essentially a negative campaign against blacklisted candidates, based on their
backgrounds.58 In any case, there have been two major elections since the
April 13, 2000, general election: the June 13, 2002, election of provincial
governors and mayors, and city, county, and local district council members;
and the August 8, 2002, special elections for National Assembly seats. Interestingly, citizens’ organizations did not engage in organized activities in either election.
On October 18, 2002, more than 270 citizens’ groups formed a new group,
the 16th Presidential Election (i.e., December 19, 2002) Voters’ Solidarity for
Fair Election (VSFE).59 Sohn Bong Ho, co-chair of VSFE, announced that
the organization would concentrate primarily on positive campaigning, by
educating voters about candidates’ positions on major policy issues.60 He
also indicated that VSFE would monitor the campaign of candidates with
regard to instigating regionalism for their own political benefits. VSFE asserted that it would not engage in any negative campaigns or blacklisting
against any specific candidate(s). It would be interesting to see how VSFE
conducts its activities for fair and clean presidential elections as this would
set the tone for the future role of citizens’ organizations in political elections
in South Korea.
Several factors are likely to influence the future roles of civic organizations
in South Korean elections. Given the impact CAGE had on the processes and
58. <http://www.ngojoongang.or.kr/column/January 22, 2002>.
59. Donga Ilbo [East Asia Daily], October 18, 2002, p. A-29.
60. Ibid.
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outcomes of the National Assembly election of April 13, 2000, civic organizations can be expected to continue to exert their agendas in the political
processes, including elections at various levels. One important switch in their
approaches will likely be toward greater concentration on comparative evaluations of policy proposals and the campaign promises of various parties and
candidates. Civic organizations will actively screen the backgrounds and
qualifications of nominees for important political appointments, including
cabinet posts, since the general public may have more confidence in the organizations’ nominally politically neutral assessments than in formal and partisan interest-driven parliamentary screening procedures. As the decisionmaking processes of political parties become more democratic and transparent, civic organizations may increasingly return to concentrating on their
original purposes. Nevertheless, as special interest groups form their own political action committees and aggressively promote their agendas, civic organizations may have to play the role of impartial judges in Korean political
processes.

